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Abstract
This is an excerpt from How Lawyer’s Lose Their Way: A Profession Fails Its
Creative Minds. Professors Jean Stefancic and Richard Delgado use historical
investigation and critical analysis to diagnose the cause of the pervasive unhappi-
ness among practicing lawyers. Most previous writers have blamed the high rate
of burnout, depression, divorce, and drug and alcohol dependency among these
highly paid professionals on the narrow specialization, long hours, and intense
pressures of modern legal practice. Stefancic and Delgado argue that these pro-
fessional demands are only symptoms of a deeper problem: the way lawyers are
taught to think and reason. They show how legal education and practice have been
rendered arid and dull by formalism, a way of thinking that values precedent and
doctrine above all, exalting consistency over ambiguity, rationality over emotion,
and rules over social context and narrative.
Stefancic and Delgado dramatize the plight of modern lawyers by exploring the
unlikely friendship between Archibald MacLeish, who gave up a successful but
unsatisfying law career to pursue his literary yearnings, and Ezra Pound. Reading
the forty-year correspondence between MacLeish and Pound, Stefancic and Del-
gado draw lessons about the difficulties of attorneys trapped in worlds that give
them power, prestige, and affluence but not personal satisfaction, much less cre-
ative fulfillment. Long after Pound had embraced fascism, descended into lunacy,
and been institutionalized, MacLeish took up his old mentor’s cause, turning his
own lack of fulfillment with the law into a meaningful crusade and ultimately
securing Pound’s release from St. Elizabeths Hospital. Drawing on MacLeish’s
story, Stefancic and Delgado contend that literature, public interest work, and
critical legal theory offer tools to contemporary attorneys for finding meaning and
overcoming professional dissatisfaction.
Citation:  Jean Stefancic & Richard Delgado, How Lawyers Lose Their Way: A 
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Chapter 4: Lawyers and Their Discontents 
It was early in her second month as a new associate at Plimpton, Day, Regan, and 
Berringer, and Georgina Barras was already wondering whether she had not 
made a serious mistake. It was not just the long subway ride from her nicely 
appointed apartment on the other side of town, nor even the ten-hour days she 
found it necessary to put in to keep abreast of the work. It was more than that. She 
made a note to make a list sometime of all the things that were bothering her and 
think about it. But there was so little time, even for taking stock. Maybe she 
should have taken that job in the small firm, or the other one that they had offered 
her, as a top graduate of one of the nation’s leading schools, doing public-interest 
work. But her student loans were so large—and her salary at the firm so high. 
She’d be able to pay off her obligations in just a few years, and maybe afford a 
down payment on that condo that she and her fiancé, Dan, had had their eyes on. 
Setting her face and turning on her computer, she sighed and started the new day. 
Why are lawyers so discontented? How deep does that discontent run, and 
how much of it is attributable to formalism? If, as we suspect, a great deal is, then 
what is the solution? More training in legal ethics, as some authors suggest? New 
“myths” or self-understandings on the part of the legal profession? Less emphasis 
on managerialism and the bottom line? Does lawyers’ discontent stem from their 
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background or the existing traits (such as compulsiveness) that they bring to law 
school and the profession?1
Many other books have addressed law’s discontents, including Walter 
Bennett’s The Lawyer’s Myth: Reviving Ideals in the Legal Profession (2001), 
Deborah Rhode’s In the Interests of Justice: Reforming the Legal Profession
(2000), Mary Ann Glendon’s A Nation under Lawyers: How the Crisis in Legal 
Education Is Transforming American Society (1994), and Anthony Kronman’s 
The Lost Lawyer: Failing Ideals of the Legal Profession (1993), each offering a 
different interpretation of the problem. 
Bennett searches for a new mythology that will enable legal education to 
join law with moral training and thus overcome ethical disquiet—the lawyer’s 
secret fear that much of what he or she does is immoral.2 For Rhode, lawyers’ 
discontents stem from the pursuit of money and power—commodities that the 
average lawyer does not command in his or her own right but manages for 
others—at the expense of other values, including the public interest.3 For 
Glendon, the problem is rapid social change leading to loss of faith in the 
common law heritage, coupled with “romantic judging” that has replaced respect 
for the rule of law. She also places the blame on realists such as Oliver Wendell 
Holmes for disdaining reason, morality, and tradition and replacing them with a 
pervasive cynicism.4 (Many members of the public, too, believe that lack of ethics 
is the problem.) These tendencies feed a growing commercialization of law and a 
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rise in litigation.5 For his part, Kronman echoes Glendon’s charge that 
postmodern teaching leaves students unmoored and uninspired. He also deplores 
the recent trend to managerialism in judging and the concomitant decline of the 
lawyer-statesman and wise counselor, especially in the large firm.6 His solution as 
well entails a turn to the past in an effort to recapture classical ideals of wisdom 
and prudential judgment. 
<A>Formalism and Unhappiness 
<P1>We believe that each of these impressive works captures only part of the 
situation, and that as the story of Archibald MacLeish and Ezra Pound shows, 
lawyers’ unhappiness contains both a conceptual and a phenomenological 
dimension. The two are linked, the conceptual one having to do with the fetters 
that lawyers and judges place on their own method, the phenomenological one 
with the felt experiences of practicing under those limitations and in workplaces 
designed with them in mind. For us, MacLeish’s predicament, like that of many 
lawyers today, has roots in an approach to law and legal practice known as legal 
formalism. In law, formalism is connected to the rule of precedent and 
conservative judging. In legal education, it manifests itself in the teaching of rules 
and doctrines at the expense of social analysis. Formalism exalts internal values, 
such as ironclad consistency over ambiguity, sterile rationality over multifarious 
interpretations, rigid rules over social context and competing perspectives.7 In 
legal practice, it appears in the form of narrow specialization, hierarchical 
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organization of the law firm, the relentless pursuit of billable hours, and 
elephantine briefs addressing every conceivable eventuality and line of authority. 
Legal formalism finds counterparts in other disciplines, although we do 
not explore them in any great detail.8 For example, in history it directs inquiry to 
wars and the careers and accomplishments of great men to the exclusion of the 
roles of immigrants, women, laborers, and ordinary people. In literary 
interpretation, it focuses attention on the text and its meaning, rather than on the 
author and the social setting in which the work was written. Formalism limits the 
intellectual independence of broadly educated lawyers, caring, patient-centered 
physicians impatient with HMO rules, and scholars in a host of fields who wish to 
think beyond disciplinary boundaries.9 Formalism is the intellectual counterpart of 
the industrialization juggernaut that D. H. Lawrence deplored. Destroying the 
rhythm of life and the English countryside he loved, smokestacks, coal chutes, 
and damp mines cast a pall over the work and life of the English laborer.10 
Formalism, if carried to an excess, can numb, setting us up for takeovers, silent or 
overt, by bureaucracies, large corporations, or the state.11 
Formalism does confer advantages. It reduces to routine that which should 
be routine.12 It enables the rapid delivery of a product, such as the application of 
syllogistic reasoning to recurring situations falling under well-known rules.13 But 
if taken to an extreme, it can draw all spirit out of work, robbing it of richness, 
detail, juice, and anything else that might render it sustaining. Even MacLeish, in 
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midlife, deplored the “substitution [of] . . . the methods of scientific inquiry, 
carried over into the humanities,” which he believed “destroyed the loyalties and 
habits of the mind” of a generation of professionals and scholars.14 A competing 
approach, known as critical theory, entered law with the path-breaking work of 
the legal realists in the early years of the twentieth century. Scholars such as Karl 
Llewellyn, Lon Fuller, and Jerome Frank wrote that judicial reasoning was rarely 
determinate, that many cases allowed more than one right answer and that in 
selecting among the many available alternatives, courts and lawyers should be 
free to consider multiple sources of knowledge.15 Today, we take those principles 
of legal thinking for granted, but at the time they were truly revolutionary. The 
unhappy MacLeish in his Harvard Law School career narrowly missed the full 
flowering of legal realism16—just as lawyers who enter law today are beginning 
to suffer from its gradual erosion. MacLeish, however, was doubly cursed, for in 
his undergraduate literary studies he received training in the ornate formalism of 
Victorian writing.17 This is what the imagist Pound, who wielded words like a 
scalpel, detested in the younger man’s writing.18 
The succeeding sections survey the various types of unhappiness that 
lawyers suffer and the pathologies they exhibit. In doing so, they make a case, on 
both theoretical and psychological grounds, for critical theory as an antidote to the 
dissatisfaction gripping legal practice and education today (and maybe other 
professions as well).19 Law tends to attract generalists—broadly educated young 
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men and women with backgrounds in literature and the humanities who wish to 
devote their lives to the betterment of society. While not every law student is thus 
motivated, many are; these are the ones who most find law narrow, technical, and 
dull. After a semester or two, they lose interest in the dance of doctrine and 
Socratic games, and tune out. 
Later, when they enter practice, they find big-firm life little better.20 Even 
those who pursue public-interest careers find their longings unsatisfied. They 
encounter harried, time-pressured judges and court administrators, racist 
prosecutors and juries. They lose cases they know they should have won, win 
cases they realize they should have lost. Their clients lie to them all the time. 
After a few years, disillusion and burnout set in. Might it be that developing their 
own critique of social institutions and the role of law while in law school could 
stave off professional disappointment for these highly principled, broadly 
educated young humanist-lawyers, armoring them against psychological distress 
and professional burnout down the line? 
Even the practitioner who works in a large law firm might gain from the 
realist approach. It can help the pressured young lawyer to understand the source 
of those pressures and whence they emanate.21 He or she may then either make 
peace with those pressures, or develop means to counter them. Finally, the lawyer 
with a grounding in critical theory can assist the profession in advancing all the 
objectives that Kronman, Glendon, Rhode, and Bennett highlight, while attending 
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to the neglected theoretical and social dimensions of legal work. Our counter-
formalist analysis might prove useful as well to physicians complaining of 
bureaucratized, by-the-numbers medicine, academics laboring under regimes of 
excessive accountability, and other professionals squeezed by routinization, 
specialization, and loss of opportunities to display creativity and imagination on 
the job. 
Now, it is time to look at an unhappy profession in greater detail. What do 
ABA studies and reports by journalists, sociologists, and lawyers themselves say 
about the hedonic level of lawyers’ lives? What do we know about billable hours, 
inadequate opportunities for pro bono work, career pressures, addictive behavior 
such as drinking or drug taking, divorce, and suicide? 
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